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Efficient brain–computer interfaces (BCIs) are in need of knowledge about the human
brain and how it interacts, plays games, and socializes with other brains. A breakthrough
can be achieved by revealing the microfoundations of sociality, an additional component
of the utility function reflecting the value of contributing to group success derived from
social identity. Building upon our previous behavioral work, we conduct a series of
functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) experiments (N = 10 in the Pilot Study
and N = 15 in the Main Study) to measure whether and how sociality alters the
functional activation of and connectivity between specific systems in the brain. The
overarching hypothesis of this study is that sociality, even in a minimal form, serves
as a natural mechanism of sustainable cooperation by fostering interaction between
brain regions associated with social cognition and those related to value calculation.
We use group-based manipulations to induce varying levels of sociality and compare
behavior in two social dilemmas: Prisoner’s Dilemma and variations of Ultimatum Game.
We find that activation of the right inferior frontal gyrus, a region previously associated
with cognitive control and modulation of the valuation system, is correlated with activity
in the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) to a greater degree when participants make
economic decisions in a game with an acquaintance, high sociality condition, compared
to a game with a random individual, low sociality condition. These initial results suggest
a specific biological mechanism through which sociality facilitates cooperation, fairness
and provision of public goods at the cost of individual gain. Future research should
examine neural dynamics in the brain during the computation of utility in the context of
strategic games that involve social interaction for a larger sample of subjects.
Keywords: prosocial actions, sociality, value calculation, social cognition, BCI
INTRODUCTION
Daily life confronts us with social situations and interactions on a regular basis. Thus, economic
decisions are often embedded in a social context. However, we rarely think of how the brain
processes the decisions we make, especially those decisions that affect the outcomes of other people
with our decisions. Social factors such as group membership and affiliation motives have powerful
effects on a range of behaviors, suggesting that these factors carry substantial decision utility for
people. However, this “social utility” is rarely included in the formal models of economic behavior.
This paper triangulates the theories of human social behavior from social psychology, decision
modeling techniques from behavioral economics, and brain-imaging tools from neuroscience
to draw a more precise picture of the mechanisms by which social factors influence economic
decisions.
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Recent efforts to unite these traditions have proven fruitful
in delivering theoretical insights and a model-based precision
to the study of economic behavior in a realistic social context
(Akerlof and Kranton, 2000, 2010; Perc and Szolnoki, 2010;
Perc et al., 2013; Lukinova et al., 2014; Berkman et al., 2015).
One behavioral study (Berkman et al., 2015) confirmed that
socialization induces prosocial behavior in economic games
due to sociality. Participants are introduced in groups creating
group differentiation, which easily satisfies the minimal group
requirement (Tajfel, 1978). In line with Social Identity Theory
we assert some esteem or value is gained by boosting the group
(or derogating the outgroup; Tajfel and Turner, 1979) and, in
turn, this additional value (Lukinova et al., 2014) plays a decisive
role in encouraging prosocial actions. Building upon results of
our behavioral work, we now report on a series of functional
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) experiments that utilize the
fMRI technology in combination with socialization and well-
known economic games to measure whether and how sociality
alters the functional activation of and connectivity between
the social cognition network and the valuation network in the
brain.
We use experiments in fMRI and laboratory facilities in
an attempt to study the neural mechanisms of human social
interactions and the microfoundations of prosocial behavior. The
main novelty and contribution of this paper is in the reality of
social interactions as opposed to artificial social interactions and
in the combination of two social dilemmas in the fMRI study.
To our knowledge the Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) and various
representations (sequential vs. simultaneous; matrix vs. a game
tree) of Ultimatum Game (UG) have not appeared together in
prior neuroeconomics research. Our study follows pioneer fMRI
studies that compare PD to other games (e.g., Stag Hunt; Emonds
et al., 2011, 2012). Besides regular UG we use Welfare Game
(WG), a novel 2 × 2 simultaneous version of UG that preserves
the distributional essence of the game, as well as its antecedent,
the UG.
Using fMRI gives us a unique perspective on how sociality
works. We examine neural dynamics in specific systems when
people compute their utility in the context of strategic games
that involve various levels of social interaction. Social science
researchers use neuroimaging as the key tool to understand
the nature of the various peculiar aspects of human behavior
such as “economic irrationality” (Peterson, 2005), altruism and
“altruistic punishment” (De Quervain et al., 2004; Waytz et al.,
2012), asymmetry between gains and losses (Yacubian et al.,
2006), cooperation (Fett et al., 2014; Watanabe et al., 2014),
preference of egalitarian outcomes (Sanfey et al., 2003; Tricomi
et al., 2010; Dawes et al., 2012; Yamagishi et al., 2012; Osinsky
et al., 2013), decision about an unfair split (Gürog˘lu et al., 2014),
and theory of mind (Lee and Harris, 2015; Strombach et al.,
2015). If social neuroscience (Cacioppo et al., 2002; Norman
et al., 2012) attempts to understand mechanisms that underlie
social behavior using a mix of biological and social approaches
(Willingham and Dunn, 2003), neuroeconomics opens up the
“black box” of the brain by finding neural correlates of choice
behavior (Camerer et al., 2005; Lohrenz and Montague, 2008;
Glimcher and Fehr, 2013; Lampert et al., 2014; Schroeder
and Graziano, 2015) and behavior under risk and uncertainty
(Hsu et al., 2005). Unfortunately, current knowledge of neural
mechanisms in prosocial decision making is still limited (Fehr
and Camerer, 2007; Lee, 2008; Emonds et al., 2011, 2012, 2014;
Declerck et al., 2013; Declerck and Boone, 2015; Kuss et al.,
2015).
For the purposes of this paper, sociality, or social utility,
is defined as an additional component of the utility function
reflecting the value of contributing to group success derived
from social identity, defined as knowledge, value, and emotional
significance for group membership (Tajfel, 1982). In economic
terms, social identity may be one of the mechanisms by which
sociality comes to have a positive decision utility. There are many
ways of manipulating sociality for the purpose of testing its effect
on economic decisions and the associated neural systems. To our
knowledge, a formal typology of the various kinds of sociality is
not currently available, even though such a typology would be
quite useful for the present line of research and related efforts.
In the course of our behavioral research, we surveyed the relevant
literature and identified two broad classes of social manipulations
(Low sociality and High sociality). We follow on this distinction
in our fMRI study. In particular, during our Pilot fMRI Study
we compare playing with humans to playing with computers,
whereas in the main study we focus on the difference between
the behavior in economic games where the opponent is a random
individual or an acquaintance.
We have specific, a priori hypotheses about the likely brain
regions involved in each of the two target processes (sociality
and valuation). A growing body of work implicates the ventral
striatal dopamine circuit in the integration and calculation of
subjective value or utility, including the ventromedial prefrontal
cortex (vmPFC), the ventral aspects of the caudate (vC), and
the nucleus accumbens (nAcc; Plassmann et al., 2007; Hare
et al., 2008; Ruff and Fehr, 2014). Social cognition, on the
other hand reliably recruits activation in a network of brain
regions including the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (dmPFC),
the posterior cingulate cortex (PCC), and the temporoparietal
junction (TPJ; Amodio and Frith, 2006; Van Overwalle, 2009).
Pertinent to the present research, a recent study found that
activity in TPJ tracked perceived social distance between an actor
and a target, and interacted with the vmPFC, a region involved
in value calculation, to modulate the actor’s decisions about how
to divide up a fixed pot of money to be shared by the actor and
the target (Strombach et al., 2015). This study provides proof-of-
concept that social cognition regions can interact with valuation
regions to influence economic decisions. Existent reviews in
neuroeconomics add another neural network that is consistently
recruited when people face social dilemmas, i.e., network related
to cognitive control (Declerck et al., 2013). Thus, one can
formulate a competing hypothesis: the interaction of cognitive
control and valuation regions of the brain facilitate prosocial
decision making.
Since our experimental design includes two types of economic
games we can also examine the question of whether the neural
bases of social welfare choices are different from those of
collective action. The regions of the brain associated with reward
and valuation are under our focus and we hypothesize that these
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brain regions should be more active during the fair condition
than during the unfair condition in the UG. Indeed, the vmPFC
is reported to activate during tasks involving inequality in
social settings (Fliessbach et al., 2007; Tabibnia et al., 2008;
Tricomi et al., 2010; Aoki et al., 2015). Inequality is noticed
by participant once reward comparison between the other and
herself is accomplished. However, it also hurts when she realizes
that she falls behind. We hypothesize that there will be an
increased activity in the reward associated brain regions (vmPFC)
as well as the brain regions critical for processing emotions,
such as amygdala and OFC (Davidson et al., 2000; Dolan, 2002)
in variations of UG condition as opposed to the PD game
condition.
A more precise understanding of the mechanisms by which
sociality affects economic decisions in a collective action situation
is the essential next step in improving social brain–computer
interfaces (BCIs; Sexton, 2015).
MATERIALS AND METHODS
All participants are recruited through advertisements on
campus. All subjects are right handed, healthy, have normal
or corrected-to-normal vision, have no history of psychiatric
diagnoses, neurological or metabolic illnesses, and are not taking
medications that can interfere with the performance of fMRI.
Participants can be of any gender and ethnicity, but must be at
least 18 years old. The only exclusion criterion is based on MRI
safety screening (ferromagnetic metal in the body, e.g., dental
braces). The participants in the fMRI experiment can earn $5 just
for showing up on the day of experiment and up to $20 more,
depending on their decisions throughout the game. During all
game conditions the participants earned a number of points that
was later transferred to money. Subjects provide written informed
consent approved by the University of Oregon Human Studies
Committee.
On the day of experiment, four people are invited to the
conference room in Lewis Center for neuroimaging (LCNI) that
is adjacent to the scanning suite. Thus, in every experiment one
participant for the fMRI experiment is paired with three other
subjects for the reality of the high sociality conditions: Human
and Acquaintance. Before they participate in economic games the
subjects have time to get to know each other and engage in an
informal conversation, i.e., undergo socialization, the technique
adopted from our behavioral research (Berkman et al., 2015).
Specifically, the participants are asked to introduce themselves by
name to the others and say one exciting thing about themselves.
The participants then embark on a 10-min interaction with the
goal of creating a list of five attributes they all have in common to
report back to the experimenter. Finally, one of the participants
is asked to go to the scanning room for fMRI experiment and
remaining three participants stay in the conference room and
proceed with a computer experiment.
Computer experiment laboratory data (N = 75) are collected
with the help of the z-Tree (Zurich Toolbox for Readymade
Economic Experiments) software package (Fischbacher, 2007).
The stimuli presentation is identical to the fMRI experiment, with
one row chooser and two column choosers (one of the column
choosers plays against a predetermined computer strategy).
Pilot Study
Subjects of the fMRI experiment are 10 UO college students (five
females). Stimuli include two sociality conditions (human and
computer opponents), two game conditions (PD and WGs), a
feedback screen that shows profit of participant based on her
decision, and a control condition.
The PD payoff matrix is formed around (1, 2, 4, 6; Table 1)
values. When one participant defects and the other cooperates,
then defector gets the maximum value – 6, and the cooperator
receives the minimum payoff of 1. If both cooperate, participants
get four each, whereas if both defect, they get two each.
The WG is a novel game not seen in prior research. It
resembles a simultaneous version of the UG with an option for
an unfair offer. The UG is a game often played in laboratory
experiments in which two players interact to decide how to divide
a sum of money that is given to them. One of the players proposes
how to divide the sum between the two players, and the other can
either accept or reject this proposal. If the second player rejects
the proposal, none of the players receive anything. However,
if the second player accepts, the money is split according to
the proposal. Usually the game is played only once or with a
randomly chosen partner so that reciprocation is not an issue.
For the same reason, players do not change roles within one
game. The equilibrium in the UG is not in the favor of the
second player. By rejecting the proposal, the second is choosing
nothing rather than something. So, for a rational player it would
be better to accept any proposal that gives any amount bigger
than 0. Contrary to the economic theory of self-interest, multiple
studies (Henrich, 2004; Oosterbeek et al., 2004) show that in
many cultures people offer (50:50) splits and offers less than 20%
are usually rejected.
The WG’s payoff structure corresponds to values in PD (1,
2, 4, 6; Table 1) Based on the payoffs the row chooser always
prefers to choose up. The column chooser’s best response to the
row chooser’s dominant strategy is to choose left. That is why the
Nash equilibrium is (2; 6). However, the row chooser always gets
a worse payoff than the column chooser. So, if the row chooser
prefers egalitarian outcomes, the row player’s deviation from the
equilibrium can occur and result in either of the two egalitarian
options: (1; 1) and (4; 4).
Prior to entering the scanner the subjects complete a series of
practice trials of a similar game on paper. This ensures that the
TABLE 1 | Prisoner’s dilemma (PD) and Welfare game (WG) payoffs.
PD Welfare Game
L R L R
U 4, 4 1, 6 U 2, 6 6, 2
D 6, 1 2, 2 D 1, 1 4, 4
PD and WG payoffs are presented in the matrix form. One of the players chooses
between rows, i.e., between up (U) and down (D). The other player (randomly
paired) chooses between columns, i.e., between left (L) and right (R).
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participants understand and are ready for the stimuli presented
in the actual experiment. Participants are told on the day of
experiment that they will be Row choosers [choosing between
up (U) and down (D)] and will maintain the same role for
the whole experiment. Subjects are instructed to look at the
central plus sign, and had to switch their attention from the
central plus sign to the game stimulus (a table 2 × 2 that is
centered on the central plus sign) in each trial to determine
the their response by pressing either left or right button on the
button box in their right hand. Subjects know that by pressing
the left button, they choose up (U) and by pressing the right
button – down (D). This study uses deception. Participants are
told that their opponents in the high sociality condition are
humans. In reality, the participant in the fMRI study always
plays a computerized strategy with fixed probabilities: for PD
game, right (R) with p = 0.85, left (L) with p = 0.15; for
WG, L with p = 0.85, R with p = 0.15. Feedback collected
following the experiment indicates that the deception was
effective and that subjects believed that their opponents were
human.
In order to answer the research questions the following
neural experimental design is used. The experiment consisted
of four blocks [Humans + PD (PG1), Humans + WG (PG2),
Computers + PD (CG1), Computers +WG (CG2)] with events
within each block. To distinguish between blocks the instruction
screen in the beginning of each block indicates whether the
participant will play a computer or a human. The game condition
does not change throughout the block. The blocks are alternated:
for half of the participants the order is PG1, PG2, CG1,
CG2, for the other half – CG1, CG2, PG1, PG2. We use an
event-related fMRI design with a pseudorandom (predetermined
unpredictable) order of game and control condition within
a block with the same interstimulus and intertrial intervals
used in M. Posner attention studies (Flombaum and Posner,
2005; Abdullaev et al., 2010) that approximate an exponential
distribution with a certain mean. The jittering of the time
intervals between game and feedback and between feedback and
the next trial is done in order to separate brain activity to the game
and feedback stimuli.
In the game condition (Figure 1), the plus sign remains on
the center of the screen for 1000 ms. The game stimulus follows
after a variable interval (“one of 12 predetermined intervals
including three 300 ms intervals, and one each of 550, 800,
1050, 1550, 2300, 3300, 4800, 6550, and 11800 ms, approximating
an exponential distribution with a mean interval of 2800 ms;”
Abdullaev et al., 2010). The game stimulus stays until response or
for 30000 ms. Then a fixation screen is on for 1000 ms followed by
another variable intertrial interval (mean of 6000 ms) and finally
the feedback screen is on for 2000 ms till the onset of the next
trial.
In the control condition, the plus sign remains on the center of
the screen for 1000 ms. The control stimulus (each cell in Figure 1
2× 2 table is replaced with “X, X”) follows after a variable interval
(mean of 2800 ms). The control stimulus stays until response or
for 5000 ms. As in the game condition, then fixation screen is
on for 1000 ms followed by another variable intertrial interval
(mean of 6000 ms) till the onset of the next trial. Four blocks are
presented, and each block has 30 trials (20 game condition trials
and 10 control condition trials) with a different pseudorandom
order of conditions and intervals.
Responses are recorded with two buttons on an MRI-
compatible button box. Reaction times (RT) are measured from
the game stimulus to the button press. The control trial is
constructed in order to isolate the mechanical activity of the
finger pressing on the button box. We expected that with each
button press, we should see the ipsilateral cerebellum and the
contralateral primary motor cortex activation. Also there is a 30 s
baseline period in front of each block with no stimuli except a
central plus sign for fixation. So that each condition of the task
can be compared to the baseline period.
fMRI stimuli are presented for the participant in the MRI
scanner and behavioral data are collected using the Presentation
program1 run on a computer. Stimuli are presented with a digital
projector/reverse screen display system to the screen at the back
end of the MRI scanner bore. Subjects see the screen via a
small tilted mirror attached to the birdcage coil in front of their
eyes.
Imaging is performed using a 3T Siemens Allegra head-only
MRI scanner at Lewis Center for Neuroimaging. A standard
birdcage coil is used to acquire data from the entire brain.
Subjects wear earplugs and earphones to protect their hearing.
Additional soft padding is used between earphones and inside the
wall of the head coil to diminish head movements.
For functional MRI, the EP2D-BOLD (Blood oxygen level
dependent) sequence is run with repetition time (TR)= 2000 ms,
echo time (TE) = 30 ms, flip angle = 90◦, Field of View
(FOV) = 200 mm. The brain is covered with 32 4 mm thick
slices acquired in a custom manner (first even slices and then odd
slices). For structural MRI scan, the 3D Magnetization Prepared
Rapid Acquisition Gradient Echo (MPRAGE) TR = 2500 ms,
TE = 4.3 8ms, flip angle = 8◦, FOV = 256, 160 slices is run
for 8 min to acquire 1 mm3 high resolution anatomical scans for
registration purposes.
Main Study
Subjects of the fMRI experiment are 15 individuals recruited from
the Eugene, OR community, college-aged (eight females). The
procedures are nearly identical to the Pilot Study, except for the
sociality, game conditions, and fMRI acquisition. Stimuli include
two within-subject opponent conditions, Low sociality (Random
Individual), and High sociality (Acquaintance), and two within-
subject game conditions, PD, UG as responder. Thus, each trial
falls into one of four cells, with participants playing anonymously
against either someone from the Eugene community who the
participant has not met or someone from the socialized group,
and playing the PD game, or the UG game as responder. This
study uses deception. Although participants believe they are
playing with real people (according to participants’ feedback),
the opponent in all three games is in reality a computer
that follows the Nash equilibrium strategy with random noise
to reduce suspicion. Following the game phase of each trial,
participants are shown a feedback screen displaying the profit the
1www.neurobehavioralsystems.com
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FIGURE 1 | Game condition schedule. Following the fixation cross, there is a game phase for each trial, where participants need to make a choice in a social
dilemma. After pressing on the button box, participants are shown a feedback screen displaying the profit the participants earn based on their decision and the
decision of their partner.
participant earned based on their decision and the decision of the
partner.
Therefore, the experiment consists of four blocks
(Acquaintance + PD, Acquaintance + Ultimatum, Random
Individual + PD, Random Individual + Ultimatum) with
30 trials within each block (20 experimental and 10 control
trials). To distinguish between blocks the instruction screen in
the beginning of each block specifies, whether the participant
would play against a person from his/her Socialized group
(Acquaintance) or against a Random Individual.
The PD game payoffs are the same as in Pilot Study (Table 1).
The UG is modeled in such a way that a participant always
chooses between two options, either accept an unfair offer that
corresponds to up (U) or reject the offer pressing down (D).
Equally likely are offered (2; 6) and (3; 5) splits, where the lesser
value is an offer to a participant.
MR scans are acquired in the Siemens Skyra 3 Tesla scanner
at LCNI, a research-dedicated, whole-body system optimized
for functional brain imaging. Participants are situated in the
scanner by one of LCNI’s imaging technicians, who also control
the scanner during the session. Experimental stimuli (e.g.,
images, instructions) are presented using a magnet-compatible,
rear-projection system controlled by a PC using Presentation
Software. Participant responses (e.g., up/down decisions) are
collected on a 10-key button box (only two buttons are
used) capable of recording responses to the millisecond level.
A shimming protocol maximizes homogeneity in the field, and
a 30 s, T2∗-weighted scout allows slice prescriptions for all
subsequent scans. We acquire a high-resolution anatomical T1-
weighted MP-RAGE scan (TR/TE = 2300/2.1 ms, 192 × 192
matrix, 1 mm thick, 160 sagittal slices, FOV = 256), functional
images with a T2*-weighted echo-planar scan (33 axial slices,
TR/TE = 2000/30 ms, 90-deg flip, 64 × 64 matrix, 4 mm thick,
FOV = 200), and in-plane gradient echo field map magnitude
and phase images to correct for inhomogeneities in the magnetic
field (33 axial slices, TR/TE = 345/8.06 ms, 40-deg flip, 64 × 64
matrix, 4 mm thick, FOV= 200).
Analysis
The epochs used for the analysis are from the game stimulus on-
set until response.
FSL Procedures
The Pilot Study is first analyzed using General Linear Modeling
(GLM) as implemented in the FSL 5.0.2 (FMRIB Software
Library). fMRI data is analyzed using FEAT (FMRIB Expert
Analysis Tool) available as part of FSL2 (Smith et al., 2004).
Preprocessing includes the default options, such as separating
images of brain from the rest of the images of the head, i.e.,
creating a brain mask, using the Brain Extraction Tool (BET;
Smith, 2002), pre-whitening for local autocorrelation correction
using FILM (FMRIB Improved Linear Model; Woolrich et al.,
2001), motion correction based on rigid-body transformations
using MCFLIRT (Motion Correction FMRIB Linear Image
Registration Tool; Jenkinson et al., 2002), spatial smoothing
using a Gaussian kernel and highpass temporal filtering as
implemented in FSL as well as slice timing correction using a
customized text file.
The analysis is done in three steps. On the first level we
analyze each session’s data, i.e., execute time-series analysis
of the raw 4D fMRI data. We generate voxel-wise parameter
estimates of the hemodynamic (blood-oxygen-level-dependent)
responses to the different stimuli we used in the fMRI experiment.
These voxel-wise parameter estimates represent the change in
the blood-oxygenation level for a given stimulus compared to
the baseline neural activation of no stimulus presentation and
control stimulus. Modeled regressors include cooperation, i.e.,
choosing up (U) in PD game both in the human and computer
2www.fmrib.ox.ac.uk/fsl
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conditions, C_PG1 and C_CG1, respectively; defection, D_PG1
and D_CG1; inequity aversion [down (D) in WG], IA_PG2 and
IA_CG2; and inequity tolerance, IT_PG2 and IT_CG2. Each
explanatory variable is created by convolving the stimulus actual
duration times (from onset of stimulus till response using one
of the buttons) within each stimulus with a standard gamma
hemodynamic response function using FEAT. Through first-level
analysis, we obtain parameter estimates as well as statistical maps
for each regressor.
On the second level we combine each subject’s activation
across several blocks and create contrasts (for human vs.
computer conditions: C_PG1 vs. C_CG1, D_PG1 vs. D_CG1,
IA_PG2 vs. IA_CG2, IT_PG2 vs. IT_CG2; and WF vs. PD:
IA_PG2 vs. C_PG1) using a fixed effects analysis with cluster-
level statistical threshold of Z > 2.3 and p < 0.05. In order to
compare human condition to computer condition and inequity
aversion in WG to cooperation in PD we subtract one stimulus
type (e.g., in Low sociality condition) from another type (e.g.,
in High sociality condition). The hypothesis of interest here is
whether in each voxel the activation to human condition stimuli
is greater than in computer condition. We also implement this
type of contrast in the opposite direction, i.e., where activation
in computer condition is higher than activation in human
condition. In result, we generate statistical maps for each of the
five contrasts for each subject. These contrast activation maps
are registered to each subject’s own high-resolution structural
image and also to the Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI)
152-standard template.
Finally on the third level, we use FLAME (FMRIB’s Local
Analysis of Mixed Effects) modeling and one-sample t-test to
decide whether the group activates on average. Mixed effects
model the subject variability and, therefore, allow making
inferences about the wider population from which the subjects
are drawn. Each of the contrasts for the group are Gaussianized
intro Z-statistical images and thresholded at Z > 2.3 with a
cluster-corrected significance threshold of p < 0.05 (Worsley,
2001). The high resolution structural MRI images of individual
subjects are standardized to the MNI space and averaged within
the group to create an average structural template.
SPM 12 Procedures
The Main Study is analyzed using identical procedures in
SPM12 (Wellcome Department of Cognitive Neurology, London,
UK3), which includes correction for field inhomogeneities,
realignment, and coregistration of functional images to each
subject’s own high-resolution structural image using a six-
parameter rigid body transformation model, reorientation to the
plane containing the anterior and posterior commissures, spatial
normalization into space compatible with an MNI atlas, and
smoothing using a 6 mm3 FWHM Gaussian kernel. Statistical
analyses are implemented in SPM12. For each participant,
event-related condition effects are estimated according to
the general linear model, using a canonical hemodynamic
response function, high-pass filtering (128 s), and a first-order
autoregressive error structure. At the individual level, BOLD
3www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm/
signal is modeled in a fixed effects analysis with separate
regressors modeling each condition of interest during the game
presentation period, for the decision making, and feedback
periods. Linear contrasts are created for each comparison of
interest (e.g., PD + High Sociality vs. UG + High Sociality,
PD + Low Sociality vs. UG + Low Sociality, PD + High
Sociality vs. PD + Low Sociality, and UG + High Sociality
vs. UG + Low Sociality). These contrasts are then imported
to group-level random effects analyses for inference to the
population. The above-threshold activations table (shown at
P < 0.05, FWE) is created with WFU_pickatlas4. The particular
regions reported in the results are visualized using xjView
toolbox5.
PPI in AFNI
Psychophysiological interaction (PPI) analysis is conducted in
AFNI6. We define the seed region as medial PFC (defined
using the Harvard–Oxford structural atlas7). The PPI analysis
identifies regions showing differential coupling with the mPFC
during High Sociality vs. Low Sociality conditions. The mPFC
ROI is projected from MNI space to individual subject space,
the time series data are extracted from the combined left
and right mPFC, and terms associated with the baseline,
linear drift, and head motion are removed. These cleaned
time series data are deconvolved with an assumed gamma
impulse response function, and then multiplied by the High
Sociality vs. Low Sociality condition contrast to generate
an interaction term. An additional GLM is implemented as
before, but with additional regressors corresponding to the
deconvolved mPFC time series, the High Sociality vs. Low
Sociality condition contrast, and the interaction of these two
regressors, which is the key term in the PPI analysis. This
final interaction regressor is used to identify brain regions
in which functional coupling with the mPFC differs during
the interaction with an Acquaintance compared to Random
Individual. Beta weights corresponding to this interaction
regressor are converted to Z-scores to allow for between-subject
comparison.
RESULTS
Behavioral Results
In the PD the trend is typical, with high (moderate) levels of
cooperation in the first few rounds devolving into consistent
moderate (high) levels of defection. The only difference
is witnessed between high sociality (humans, acquaintances)
and low sociality (computers, random individuals) conditions
(Table 2). Playing acquaintances in the Main Study resulted in
slightly higher levels of cooperation than those in the Pilot Study
for Humans condition. Nevertheless, we observe significant
difference between cooperation rates in the PD in the Pilot Study
4http://www.nitrc.org/projects/wfu_pickatlas/
5http://www.alivelearn.net/xjview
6http://afni.nimh.nih.gov/sscc/gangc/CD-CorrAna.html
7http://www.cma.mgh.harvard.edu/
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TABLE 2 | Computer experiment behavioral results.
Pilot study conditions Cooperation in PD Inequity tolerance in WG Main study conditions Cooperation in PD Inequity tolerance in UG
Human 28% 30% Acquaintance 49% 76%
Computer 16% 46% Random individual 18% 66%
Behavioral results of computer experiments for Pilot and Main studies are reported. The percentages of cooperative decisions (choose U or L in the PD) and the frequency
of inequity tolerance decisions (choose U in the WG or accepted an unfair offer in the UG) across studies and conditions are listed.
TABLE 3 | fMRI experiment behavioral results.
Pilot study conditions Cooperation in PD Inequity tolerance in WG Main study conditions Cooperation in PD Inequity tolerance in UG
Human 26% 40% Acquaintance 34% 71%
Computer 15% 62% Random individual 21% 51%
Behavioral results of fMRI experiments for Pilot and Main studies are reported.
(Humans vs. Computers, N = 30, p-value = 0.002, t-test) and in
the Main Study (Acquaintances vs. Random Individuals, N = 45,
p-value= 0.0006, t-test).
Results of the Computer Experiment for Welfare and UGs
are puzzling. Whereas for WG the egalitarian outcome (inequity
aversion), rather than Nash equilibrium (2; 6) is more likely,
for the UG accepting unfair offers (inequity tolerance) is
predominant. The difference between sociality conditions is not
significant.
For the fMRI portion of the experiment the same pattern
remains: rates of cooperation are significantly higher for the high
sociality condition than those for the low sociality condition
(Table 3; Pilot Study: Humans vs. Computers, N = 10,
p-value = 0.001, t-test; Main Study: Acquaintances vs. Random
Individuals, N = 15, p-value = 0.02, t-test). It is important
to notice that the cooperation level averages oscillated around
the mean till the very last round due to the persistent tests
of cooperative strategy by participants that face nasty Nash
equilibrium computerized strategy.
We observe significant difference between sociality
conditions, for the Welfare and UG (Pilot Study: Humans
vs. Computers, N = 10, p-value = 0.05, t-test; Main Study:
Acquaintances vs. Random Individuals, N = 15, p-value = 0.05,
t-test). The directions of the effect are distinct: acceptance of
unfair offers is higher for Computers (low sociality) compared
to Humans (high sociality) conditions, but is lower for Random
Individual (low sociality) compared to Acquaintance (high
sociality) conditions, similar to what is seen in the Computer
Experiment. The WG is a simultaneous game, whereas the UG is
sequential. In the UG the subject accepts or rejects the offer that
is presented to her. In the WG she does not know what will be
offered, so it is not necessarily inequity aversion, but might be
as well risk aversion. In other words in WG the subject provides
a hedge against potential inequity by forcing the egalitarian
outcome, whereas in the UG it is not possible without losing
everything. That is why in UG most of the subjects tolerate
inequity.
fMRI Results, Pilot Study
The fMRI analysis of the Pilot Study in FSL focuses on the
functional activity pattern associated with social domain and
economic games participants play. We determine areas in the
brain where the neural activation is higher for subjects playing
with humans, than playing with computers in completing several
different tasks. We report functional activation in the areas as
specified in MNI structural atlas (Mazziotta et al., 2001; Collins
et al., 2004) and Talairach Daemon Labels atlas (Lancaster et al.,
2000).
Cooperation in the PD game with humans compared to
cooperation in PD with computers is associated with a signal
increase in dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC), Brodmann
areas (BA) 8 and 9 (Cooperation contrast: BA 8 [x = 69, y = 69,
z = 55 (MNI_152 space coordinates)], Z-score = 3.01467).
Whereas BA 9 functions include sustaining attention and
working memory, BA 8 is even more intriguing, as it is
linked to the management of uncertainty (Platt and Huettel,
2008) as well as hopes or high expectations. Many studies see
DLPFC as a contributor to rational decision-making in social
situations. Although cooperation in the PD game is seen by
many as irrational, the theory of sociality (Lukinova et al., 2014;
Berkman et al., 2015) provides a rational explanation for such
behavior by adding an economic component to the subject’s
utility function in the social context. Thus, activation in the
Cooperation contrast can be attributed to another demonstration
of sociality at work, where brain processes cooperation as a
rational decision.
Contrast between WG and PD game displays highlight in
BA 30 [x = 36, y = 45, z = 33 (MNI_152 space coordinates),
Z-score = 2.55405] that along with adjacent areas forms
posterior cingulate gyrus. Its functions include spatial memory
and orientation (Owen et al., 1996), as well as face recognition
(Leube et al., 2001). Neither the former, nor the latter directly
correspond to the stimuli presented to the subjects. BA 39
[x = 61, y = 33, z = 51 (MNI_152 space coordinates),
Z-score = 2.54531], located at the middle temporal gyrus, is
also involved in calculation (Grabner et al., 2007), as well
as in “theory of mind” (Goel et al., 1995), i.e., modeling
knowledge, rationality, etc., of another person’s mind. Indeed,
calculation and “theory of mind” occur in both games (Rilling
et al., 2004), however, while the PD game is familiar and is
frequently used in multiple courses in college, the WG, as a
rare simultaneous version of UG, requires participants to think
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TABLE 4 | Above-threshold activations (shown at P < 0.05, FWE) are presented for the contrasts of interest.
Contrast Anatomical region Coordinates (x, y, z) T-statistic Z-statistic Cluster size
PD > UG
L inferior frontal gyrus (−38, 3, 34) 11.49 4.87 2
L inferior parietal lobule (−41, −44, 58) 10.5 4.72 1
UG > PD
R superior frontal gyrus (21, 49, −18) 12.49 4.8 2
High sociality > Low sociality
L sub-gyral (−35, −38, 38) 11.08 4.81 1
L superior frontal gyrus (−10, 12, 58) 10.63 4.74 1
R inferior semi-lunar lobule (12, −60, −52) 9.28 5.15 6
L pre-central gyrus (−36, −12, 58) 8.87 5.07 10
L post-central gyrus (−40, −36, 64) 8.81 5.05 7
R cingulate gyrus (−42, −24, 40) 8.27 4.91 3
R superior temporal gyrus (50, 20, −18) 7.87 4.79 1
Low sociality > High sociality
L inferior parietal lobule (−35, −47, 46) 13.66 5.16 6
L inferior parietal lobule (−35, −56, 46) 13.16 5.09 4
L inferior frontal gyrus (−50, 9, 34) 13 5.07 2
L precuneus (−7, −62, 54) 11.02 4.8 1
R precuneus (3, −56, 54) 10.94 4.79 2
R cingulate gyrus (18, −38, 38) 8.83 5.06 1
R parahippocampal gyrus (38, −22, −18) 8.58 4.99 1
MNI_152 space coordinates are reported.
through other subject’s strategy and execute the cost-benefit
analysis.
fMRI Results, Main Study
The analysis of neuroimaging data in SPM focuses on
the functional activity pattern between games and opponent
conditions (Table 4; shown at P < 0.05, FWE).
One of the goals is to determine brain areas where neural
activation is higher in one game or another. In Pilot Study,
when participant plays in a PD Game compared to her making
decisions in a WG besides significant clusters already identified,
activation is higher in vmPFC, Brodmann area 32 (BA 32,
x = 5.70, y = 25.53, z = 34.81; T-statistic = 6.0101). It is likely
that brain activation differences between games, namely WG and
UGs, are mainly due to calculation issues and the novelty of WG
to college students. It is vital that BA 32 associated with rational
thought processes does not appear to be more activated, when
comparing PD and UG in the Main Study.
When comparing cooperation decision in PD to acceptance of
unfair offers in the UG or agreement to Nash equilibrium in the
WG, no significant clusters are found. We assert that in the social
setting the neural basis for tolerability to defection (opponent’s
strategy in PD is nasty) and tolerability to inequity (advantageous
position of column chooser in WG and unfair offer in UG) is
identical, representing confrontation with the social world that
is at times unjust and rough.
Besides the BA 8 and BA 9 activations already identified in the
Pilot Study differences between sociality conditions in PD also
show higher activations in orbitofrontal area, BA 11 (x=−28.80,
y = 50.61, z = −9.89, T-statistic = 6.0101; Figure 2),
FIGURE 2 | High sociality > Low sociality contrast (BA 11). Contrast
between High sociality and low sociality conditions reveals activations in
orbitofrontal area, BA 11 (x = −28.80, y = 50.61, z = −9.89). This area is
associated with planning, reasoning, and decision making in general.
known for its connection to planning, reasoning, and decision
making. Cooperation in high sociality condition is indeed
attributed to a well-planned and a reasonable, if not rational
decision. The contrasts between High sociality and Low sociality
involve among others the following brain activations: Superior
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FIGURE 3 | Z-scores from the seed to the inferior frontal gyrus in the
axial and sagittal views. Functional connectivity of mPFC with the right
inferior frontal gyrus, a region previously associated with cognitive control and
modulation of the valuation system. Regions depicted are found to correlate
with mPFC to a greater degree when participants make economic decisions
as they interacted with others in the high sociality condition compared to the
low sociality condition.
Frontal Gyri, Inferior Frontal Gyrus, Anterior Cingulate, and
Parahippocampal Gyrus.
We conduct preliminary connectivity tests using PPI analysis
using the mPFC as a seed, a brain region associated with
valuation. The software used for obtaining the activations is
Analysis of Functional Neuro-Images (AFNI). The presence of a
positive context-dependent interaction in a region (i.e., a PPI) can
be interpreted as greater relative connectivity between that region
and the seed in one condition compared to another. In this case,
the regions depicted in Figure 3 are found to correlate with mPFC
to a greater degree when participants made decision in PD as they
interacted with others in the high sociality condition compared
to the low sociality condition. Table 5 shows the correlation
coefficients for the areas of interest, i.e., the areas highlighted for
the High > Low Sociality contrast.
Several regions emerge that have previously been implicated
in prosocial economic choice (e.g., the right inferior frontal gyrus
TABLE 5 | R coefficients with seeded ROI in the medial frontal gyrus
(coefficient range −0.0019445 to 0.01676).
AFNI-r
coefficient
# of voxels % max
coefficient
Fusiform gyrus 0.006777 1492 0.4043
Inferior frontal gyrus 0.006322 731 0.3772
Insula 0.006274 509 0.3743
Anterior cingulate 0.006351 381 0.3789
Parahippocampal gyrus 0.005702 306 0.3402
Regions that were significantly positively correlated with medial prefrontal cortex
(mPFC) to a greater degree when participants made economic decisions as they
interacted with others in the high sociality condition compared to the low sociality
condition: r refers to the Pearson correlation coefficient relating neural activity in
that cluster and mPFC activation coefficients at the group level.
and the DLPFC; Tabibnia et al., 2008). Notably, these regions
modulate activation of the valuation system in cases when self-
control is necessary to override impulsive or habitual choices such
as selfish economic decisions (Hare et al., 2008). Several small
peaks also emerge in the valuation network proper (not shown),
but the small sample size prevents strong inferences based on
these data.
DISCUSSION
If social cognition constantly results in a different pattern of
brain activity than a non-social one and the regions of brain
activation during social cognition have a special status (high
levels of activity even at rest) in the brain (Adolphs, 2003;
Jenkins and Mitchell, 2011), to what extent are brain systems that
control social behavior domain specific (Cosmides and Tooby,
1994; Stone et al., 2007)? If evolutionary perspective provides
theoretical grounding for domain specificity, neuroscience then
gives an opportunity to investigate it.
This paper focuses on the comparison of two sociality
conditions. It is the first attempt to find what brain regions
correspond to a neural value of sociality and lay a foundation
to identify and estimate this neural value. The key is to induce
prosocial behaviors in economic games, different in nature, but
common in representation. Our findings support the theory
of sociality. Indeed, we assert that additional social utility is
calculated in the human brain, when a person interacts with
someone from the socialized group she identifies herself with.
This additional social utility may cause prosocial decisions, such
as cooperation in the PD, and may as well appear rational to the
brain. A good way of talking about sociality is by illustrating what
happens when it is impaired (Edmiston et al., 2015): sociality can
be described as the opposite of autism.
Based on our research we propose that economic games, such
as PD representing collective action and the UG, the simplest
demonstration of bargaining, can be intertwined. We observed
that presenting UG and PD together results in higher cooperation
rates than when participants deal with the PD only. One
explanation is a spillover effect produced during the UG. In the
social environment, norms of fairness in the UG may encourage
us to be as well fair in the PD, i.e., cooperate. Recent findings,
however, do not report any correlation between rejecting unfair
offers and prosocial behaviors in other games (Yamagishi et al.,
2012). The fact that we did not observe significant differences in
activations between the games could be due to highly perplexed
cognitive processes involved in these social dilemmas when
sociality is induced.
The data collected from the fMRI experiments can serve to
answer many more questions, than those raised in this paper. For
example, how do subjects perceive outcomes? While in this study,
our main focus is on the stimuli from onset till response, next we
can take into account the reaction toward the outcome displayed
to the participant. How will participants react to unfairness
or defection? Or how will participants react and what brain
activation will be related to it if they defect, while the opponent
cooperated? Why do dopaminergic and subcortical regions show
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no activation in the task? These research questions: to identify
the brain regions that are sensitive to sociality and to test the
relative effectiveness of the sociality inductions in altering neural
activation in the social cognition and valuation networks and
economic decisions – hold promise to advance the social aspects
of BCI (Sexton, 2015).
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